The Institute for the Study of War is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that analyzes publicly available military and security information, including troop deployments, weapons systems, satellite imagery, and proxy activity. ISW reporting is not confidential and provides objective, unbiased analysis.
Iran’s current strategy toward the U.S. is dual-track, combining deterrence, regional influence, and selective diplomacy. While Tehran signals conditional willingness to negotiate, it strengthens its military to increase the cost of U.S. action. The IRGC operates 150–200 Fateh-110 short-range missiles, 80–100 Zolfaghar medium-range missiles, and 30–50 Khalij Fars anti-ship ballistic missiles. Its navy fields 40–50 fast-attack boats (Peykaap and Zolfaghar) armed with C-802 and Nasr missiles, plus 2–3 forward-base ships (Shahid Soleimani and Shahid Mahdavi) capable of launching Mohajer-6 and Shahed-136 drones. Shore-based Noor and Qader cruise missiles, around 50–70 launchers, cover the Strait of Hormuz. ISW assesses that Iran’s most immediate threat to U.S. assets comes from its anti-ship missile network combined with swarm-capable fast-attack boats, which operate like a pack of wolves. Ballistic missiles, though powerful, are like single large guns: fewer, slower to reposition, and easier for U.S. defenses such as Aegis and Patriot to intercept.
Iran’s drones and loitering munitions expand its reach and flexibility. Shahed-136 drones, estimated at 200–250 units, and Mohajer-6 drones, 50–70, provide reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic support. Some Shaheds are designed to target small vessels, while others can loiter for days, giving Iran persistent coverage over critical areas. These systems are integrated with missile and naval units.
Through coordinated operations with their regional proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Iran has contributed to thousands of deaths: an estimated 500–1,000 from attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, roughly 1,500–2,000 from missile and drone strikes on Syrian military and militia positions, and over 3,000 from drone, missile, and insurgent operations in Yemen’s civil war. Domestically, the IRGC uses these forces to suppress protests and maintain regime control, linking internal stability to external deterrence. These units also ensure coordination between missile brigades, naval craft, and drones, allowing Iran to escalate or de-escalate quickly, impose operational challenges on U.S. forces, and provides plausible deniability.
ISW concludes that Iran’s strategy emphasizes deterrence, escalation management, and regional leverage, using its layered military capabilities and proxies to impose costs on the U.S. while preserving strategic autonomy and keeping diplomatic channels "open."