Greenland’s Role in Countering Russian Arctic Threats

On Friday, September 18, 2026, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland announced a no-expiry security pact expanding U.S. basing, access, and overflight rights, allowing more bases, and barring non-NATO states from bases, troops, or sensitive investments. Denmark and Greenland say sovereignty is preserved. Signing is expected next week during the United Nations General Assembly in New York, after which Danish and Greenlandic parliamentary approval is still required.

Greenland occupies one of the most strategically valuable positions on the planet. Located between North America and Eurasia, it lies beneath the primary polar routes used by Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and long-range bombers targeting the U.S. Any U.S. homeland defense strategy must account for the Arctic, and Greenland is the most important geographic advantage available to the U.S.

Russia has made the Arctic a military priority. It operates more than 50 Arctic military installations, has reopened Cold War-era bases, and fields over 40 icebreakers, including nuclear-powered vessels. The Russian Northern Fleet, responsible for roughly 66% of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, deploys ballistic missile submarines through Arctic waters and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. This corridor remains the primary maritime chokepoint between the Arctic and the North Atlantic. Without persistent surveillance and rapid-response capabilities in Greenland, U.S. and NATO forces risk losing early detection of submarine and missile activity.

The U.S. operates Pituffik Space Base in northwest Greenland under the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement with Denmark. The base hosts missile early-warning radars and space surveillance systems that feed into NORAD. These sensors provide additional warning time, extending detection windows by tens of minutes compared with systems farther south. This margin is decisive in missile defense, command decision-making, and continuity of government planning. Expanding radar coverage, space-domain awareness, and air operations from Greenland would strengthen U.S. defenses against threats, such as hypersonic weapons on polar trajectories.

Arctic sea ice has declined roughly 40% compared with late-20th-century averages, extending operating seasons for military and commercial vessels. This accessibility benefits Russia unless counterbalanced by U.S. and allied presence. Forward basing in Greenland enables year-round monitoring of Arctic airspace and maritime routes, and supports rapid force deployment during crises.

Greenland also holds large deposits of rare earth elements and critical minerals essential to advanced weapons systems and industrial supply chains. China controls roughly 60% of global rare earth production, making alternative sources strategically vital. Military basing does not grant resource rights, but a strong U.S. presence deters economic coercion, and reinforces NATO’s northern flank.

Legally, the U.S. is authorized under the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement with Denmark to build and operate military facilities. Increased U.S. military assets in Greenland are deliberate posturing toward Russia, signaling Arctic routes and airspace will be monitored and defended.