Before 9/11: Inside the Hijackers’ Suspicious Acts, Dry Runs, and Preparations for the Attack

Historically Accurate 

On August 1, 2001, actor James Woods boarded a transcontinental flight from Boston to Los Angeles. Settling into his first-class seat, he noticed he was sharing the cabin with four men of Middle Eastern descent. Over the next six hours, their behavior grew increasingly unsettling. The men sat rigidly straight, refusing food, drink, reading material, or sleep. They spoke only in low, urgent whispers. To Woods, they looked like people standing behind a performer at a live concert, completely ignoring the show to evaluate the stage itself.

Deeply unnerved, Woods clutched his metal lunch cutlery as a makeshift weapon. When one of the men unsuccessfully pressured a flight attendant to let him see the cockpit under the guise of being a "pilot-in-training," Woods flag-warned the crew: "I think this plane is going to be hijacked." The first officer reassured him, locking the flight deck door for the rest of the journey, and the crew filed a report with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Woods had unwittingly witnessed a "dry run." Following the September 11 attacks, federal agents arrived at his home, where he positively identified two of the men from photographs: Hamza Al-Ghamdi, who would hijack United Airlines Flight 175, and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, who would help crash American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon.

The encounter was not isolated. The FBI’s subsequent investigation, codenamed PENTTBOM, revealed that Al-Qaeda operatives conducted multiple high-stakes rehearsals between January and August 2001, testing the boundaries of American aviation infrastructure while hiding entirely in plain sight.

The hijackers meticulously planned their dry runs to gather tactical intelligence. They strictly targeted transcontinental Boeing 757 and 767 flights traveling from the East Coast to California because these planes carried maximum fuel loads—turning them into viable weapons of mass destruction. To avoid raising immediate red flags with immigration or airport security, the plotters booked these test flights using their real names.

Other public figures and flight crews unknowingly crossed paths with the cell during this phase.

Actor Rob Lowe unknowingly flew alongside the hijackers on a packed, transcontinental flight from Washington Dulles to Los Angeles just 11 days before the attacks.

In July 2001, Marwan al-Shehhi—the future pilot of Flight 175—stood in the first-class galley of a transcontinental flight, physically blocking the aisle leading to the cockpit. When a flight attendant asked him to sit due to turbulence, he crossed his arms and stared at her blankly, testing crew compliance until a male passenger intervened.

Flight crews reported coordinated cabin probes where groups of men would split up across a plane. Mid-flight, one would fast-walk to the front while the others simultaneously opened overhead bins and loudly swapped seats, a tactic designed to pull crew focus away from the cockpit door.

As the summer progressed, the hijackers grew bolder, leading to several near-miss encounters with security and personnel.

During a routine maintenance check on a Boeing 767 transcontinental jet in August 2001, a United Airlines mechanic found a utility box cutter stuffed deep into a first-class seat pocket. Because short blades under four inches were legally permitted by the FAA at the time, the item was simply discarded as passenger trash. Post-9/11 tracking revealed the hijackers had previously booked that exact aircraft tail number.

On May 11, 2001, an American Airlines supervisor at Boston Logan International Airport confronted Mohamed Atta and a companion filming a security checkpoint for 45 minutes. Atta cursed at him and walked away. The supervisor flagged a Massachusetts State Trooper, warning that the men were "up to something," but they were not detained.

On May 11, 2001, American Airlines technician Stephen Wallace and screener Theresa Spagnuolo saw Atta and a companion filming and photographing the main checkpoint and flight boards for about 45 minutes. Wallace confronted them, was cursed at, and flagged airport authorities. Nothing followed.

The tragedy of the 9/11 plot lies in the vast communication gaps between government agencies. The CIA had been tracking Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi since they attended an Al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000. However, the agency failed to notify the State Department to place them on the federal watch list. Consequently, both men legally entered the U.S. through Los Angeles International Airport with zero friction.

Once inside the country, the hijackers easily blended into American society. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lived openly in San Diego neighborhoods, joined gyms, and bought a used car. When pulled over for routine traffic violations, they remained entirely calm: Ziad Jarrah accepted a $270 speeding ticket in Maryland just two days before the attacks, and Hani Hanjour received a citation in Arlington, Virginia, on August 1.

Furthermore, the plot cost Al-Qaeda surprisingly little—between $400,000 and $500,000. The funds were managed by Mustafa al-Hawsawi in the United Arab Emirates and moved into the U.S. via overseas wire transfers, cash couriers, and international ATM cards. The hijackers opened valid U.S. bank accounts using their real names and genuine passports. By keeping transactions low, they remained completely invisible to financial regulators.

By late August, the dry runs stopped as the hijackers shifted to immediate operational logistics. On September 10, 2001, Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari checked into a Comfort Inn in South Portland, Maine, to catch a connecting flight to Boston the following morning.

Their final night was governed by a chilling, four-page handwritten Arabic document titled "The Last Night." Distributed as a manual to the execution teams, it ordered them to perform a ritual bath, scent themselves with cologne, shave excess body hair, and inspect their weapons, stating: "Let every one of you sharpen his blade." When hotel staff cleaned the room post-attacks, they found the beds undisturbed—the men had slept directly on top of the sheets—and the bathroom floor flooded and covered in shaved hair.

FBI chronology puts the two at a Pizza Hut area, ATMs, a gas station, and a Walmart in Scarborough at 9:22 p.m. for about 20 minutes. Official summaries mention a battery converter purchase.

On the morning of September 11, the hijackers weaponized airport pacing. Atta and al-Omari arrived tight on time for their connecting flight in Portland. Ticket agent Michael Tuohey later recalled getting a physical "chill" from Atta's cold, disdainful stare when told he would have to check his bags again in Boston, but Tuohey had no protocol to deny him boarding.

Atta was actually flagged by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) that morning. However, FAA rules dictated that a CAPPS flag only required a passenger's checked bags to be held off the plane until they boarded; it did not trigger extra physical screening or a carry-on search.

Atta made the flight, but his luggage did not transfer to Flight 11 in Boston due to the tight window. That stranded luggage became what federal investigators called the "Rosetta Stone" of the 9/11 investigation. Discovered by a ramp agent after the towers were struck, the bags contained Boeing simulator manuals, flight calculators, airline uniforms, a passport belonging to al-Omari, Atta's will, and a copy of "The Last Night" checklist.

Those bags became a central early break: Boeing materials, a will, “The Last Night,” al-Omari’s passport, and other papers. Rental-car records led agents to vehicles at Logan, Dulles, and Newark. Credit cards, tickets, and those cars let the FBI identify all 19 hijackers and map the plot’s logistics within days.