A future Iran without the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) must have strong ground forces capable of defending territory, maintaining internal security, and preventing power vacuums. One strategy to limit the need for U.S. troops would be to arm and support Kurdish forces, giving local fighters the ability to secure western Iran and create pressure on the IRGC. The IRGC currently has about 125,000 personnel and 90,000 Basij militia members, controlling Iran’s ground, air, naval, missile, and internal security operations. They are also deeply involved in politics, economics, and society. Kurds live across eastern Turkey, northern Syria, northern Iraq, and western Iran. In Iran they make up roughly 8–17% of the population, concentrated in Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan provinces. Across the Middle East, Kurdish forces number between 200,000 and 300,000, divided among regional groups. The largest is the Iraqi Peshmerga with 150,000–200,000 troops, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has 50,000–100,000 personnel, and smaller insurgent groups like the PKK. Kurds face harsh repression, representing 14% of executions and 47% of political detainees. Kurdish armed resistance has a long history, including the Simko Shikak revolt (1918–1922). Iranian Kurdish groups such as the KDPI, PJAK, Komala, and PAK maintain roughly 5,000–8,000 fighters.
The IRGC and Basij militias dominate Iran’s security structure. Kurdish operations against them face 30–50% attrition per engagement. Maintaining effectiveness requires replacing ~50% of losses per month, while disputes or miscoordination can reduce effectiveness by 10–20 %. Cross-border supply routes through Iraq are narrow and vulnerable.
Historically, Kurdish fighters have coordinated with external powers. In 2019, Kurdish units reportedly received logistical support and tactical guidance from U.S.-linked intermediaries for limited operations against the IRGC. They also sometimes received advice from Israeli intelligence and non-lethal aid, including communications gear, night-vision optics, and medical kits, which improved operational capacity despite their smaller size. According to Forbes, the CIA has reportedly provided arms, logistics, and training to Kurdish leadership to stretch IRGC forces and create operational corridors from Iraq into western Iran. Supplies included light weapons, anti-tank gear, and tactical communications, routed through Iraqi Kurdistan.
In late 2025 and early 2026, Kurdish factions engaged in protests and limited armed actions in western Iran. In March 2026, Kurdish forces reportedly captured Marivan, forcing IRGC withdrawals. This was part of the 2026 Iranian Kurdistan offensive, coordinating among five Kurdish parties. Psychological operations, including online documentation of victories, boosted local support and prompted IRGC overreactions, increasing their impact.
The mountains and terrain play a major role in Kurdish operations. Iranian Kurdish groups operate mainly in the Zagros Mountains, which provide natural defensive depth and concealment. Small, flexible cell structures of 20–50 fighters allow mobility and guerrilla tactics. Seasonal snow and heavy rainfall can temporarily isolate IRGC units, giving Kurdish fighters temporary advantages. However, these mountains also make logistics and resupply difficult. Cross-border supply routes are narrow and vulnerable to IRGC interdiction.
Kurdish units, having faced political marginalization and repression similar to civilian protesters, bring a unique perspective to security operations. A system that acknowledges these shared hardships can leverage mutual empathy between fighters and civilians, improving local cooperation and can increase overall mission effectiveness. Even with Kurdish forces and U.S. airpower, defeating the IRGC remains a daunting challenge.
Historically, Kurdish fighters have coordinated with external powers. In 2019, Kurdish units reportedly received logistical support and tactical guidance from U.S.-linked intermediaries for limited operations against the IRGC. They also sometimes received advice from Israeli intelligence and non-lethal aid, including communications gear, night-vision optics, and medical kits, which improved operational capacity despite their smaller size. According to Forbes, the CIA has reportedly provided arms, logistics, and training to Kurdish leadership to stretch IRGC forces and create operational corridors from Iraq into western Iran. Supplies included light weapons, anti-tank gear, and tactical communications, routed through Iraqi Kurdistan.
In late 2025 and early 2026, Kurdish factions engaged in protests and limited armed actions in western Iran. In March 2026, Kurdish forces reportedly captured Marivan, forcing IRGC withdrawals. This was part of the 2026 Iranian Kurdistan offensive, coordinating among five Kurdish parties. Psychological operations, including online documentation of victories, boosted local support and prompted IRGC overreactions, increasing their impact.
The mountains and terrain play a major role in Kurdish operations. Iranian Kurdish groups operate mainly in the Zagros Mountains, which provide natural defensive depth and concealment. Small, flexible cell structures of 20–50 fighters allow mobility and guerrilla tactics. Seasonal snow and heavy rainfall can temporarily isolate IRGC units, giving Kurdish fighters temporary advantages. However, these mountains also make logistics and resupply difficult. Cross-border supply routes are narrow and vulnerable to IRGC interdiction.
Kurdish units, having faced political marginalization and repression similar to civilian protesters, bring a unique perspective to security operations. A system that acknowledges these shared hardships can leverage mutual empathy between fighters and civilians, improving local cooperation and can increase overall mission effectiveness. Even with Kurdish forces and U.S. airpower, defeating the IRGC remains a daunting challenge.