Iran’s regional strategy over the past four decades has centered on projecting power through allied militant groups, often referred to collectively as the “Axis of Resistance.” This network spans multiple countries and includes organizations with varying sizes, capabilities, and local agendas. Through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds Force, Iran has invested hundreds of millions of dollars annually in building, training, and equipping these proxies, creating strategic depth that allows Tehran to influence conflicts far from its borders without committing its regular army. The most prominent and well‑resourced proxy in this portfolio is Hizballah in Lebanon, an organization estimated to have 25,000 to 30,000 fighters across its military and reserve wings, making it one of the most powerful non‑state armed groups in the world. Hizballah’s arsenal includes an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, including precision‑guided munitions capable of striking deep inside Israel. The group receives $700 million to $1 billion annually from Iran, as well as weapons shipments delivered through land routes and covert maritime channels. Hizballah’s political arm holds seats in the Lebanese parliament and exerts influence over key ministries, intertwining militant and political power.
In Iraq, Iran’s influence is channeled through a constellation of Shia militias under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). These factions, numbering roughly 50,000 fighters nationwide, receive funding, weapons, and training from the IRGC, enabling them to maintain operational capabilities and influence local politics. They have been involved in both internal Iraqi conflicts and regional expeditionary operations aligned with Tehran’s interests.
In Syria, Iran’s primary proxy forces include non‑Syrian Shia militias such as Liwa Fatemiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun. Liwa Fatemiyoun, composed primarily of Afghan refugees and migrant workers, numbered approximately 12,000 at its peak and participated in major battles to defend the Assad regime. Liwa Zainabiyoun, made up of Pakistani Shia volunteers, had several thousand fighters in similar theaters. These groups received IRGC training, salaries, and weapons, often embedded with Syrian Arab Army units. Analysts estimate Iranian‑aligned foreign fighters in Syria numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 at the height of the conflict.
In Yemen, the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, controls large swaths of the northwest, including Sanaa, with an armed force of 100,000 to 150,000 combatants. They have received significant support from Iran in the form of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. U.S. and allied assessments indicate Iran has supplied tens of ballistic and cruise missiles and hundreds of armed drones since 2015, allowing strikes on targets as far as Abu Dhabi and disruption of Red Sea shipping.
In the Palestinian territories, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a smaller but committed organization, estimated at several thousand fighters, receiving tens of millions annually from Iran along with rockets and launchers. Hamas, while not a strict proxy, has at times received Iranian financial and logistical support, particularly to its military wing in Gaza.
The cohesiveness of this network relies on multiple forms of Iranian support. Financial transfers sustain salaries, pensions, and logistics; weapons shipments provide rocket launchers, anti‑tank missiles, explosive devices, drones, and artillery; IRGC advisory staffs build command and control capabilities; and ideological indoctrination reinforces loyalty and alignment with Tehran’s goals. These groups operate without a uniform command structure but share the paradigm that Iran is the backbone of resistance against U.S. and Israeli influence.
If Iran were to lose a conflict with the U.S., the consequences for its proxy network would be profound. Without Iranian funding, proxies would face immediate cash shortfalls. Militias such as Hizballah and Iraqi PMF factions would struggle to meet payrolls. For example, losing $700 million to $1 billion annually would force Hizballah to reduce recruitment incentives and social services, triggering defections, lower morale, and increased local tensions as fighters seek alternative income or turn to illicit activity.
In Iraq, Shia militias would compete for resources in a fractious political economy, reducing operational tempo and ability to procure advanced weapons. In Syria, foreign Shia brigades would lose logistical lifelines and might disband or return to their homelands, creating destabilizing effects, while the Assad regime would need to redirect its own forces. In Yemen, the Houthis’ ability to strike beyond local borders would decline, reducing leverage in negotiations and potentially fracturing internal cohesion. In Gaza, PIJ would struggle to replace rockets and launchers, while Hamas could face capability reductions, lowering conflict intensity with Israel.
Politically, the loss of Iranian backing would weaken Hizballah’s leverage in Lebanon, diminish militia-influenced political parties in Iraq, and compel the Houthis toward power-sharing talks. Rival regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey could expand influence, offering funds or security partnerships to communities previously aligned with Iran. The U.S. and European states could engage local actors to reduce militant pathways and foster integration into formal political processes.
However, the withdrawal of Iranian support would not automatically produce stability. Militias might seek new patrons, splinter, or turn to criminalized revenue streams. Vacuums could be filled by nationalist movements, local strongmen, or extremist groups unconnected to Tehran, creating fresh regional challenges.
Ultimately, Iran’s proxy network without Tehran’s backing would see a marked decline in operational capability, strategic reach, and political clout. The Axis of Resistance’s current strength reflects sustained Iranian investment, and losing that support would force a recalibration of political strategies, military planning, and alliance structures throughout the Middle East. Whether such a shift results in stability or simply redistributes conflict dynamics remains uncertain, but the intricate web Tehran has built cannot survive in its current form without the financial, logistical, and ideological support it has long provided.